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This paper presents the various economic approaches to achieving monetary union, particularly in the 
context of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It also evaluates the implications of the 
Maastricht Treaty, in the light of the current state of economic convergence and given the economic 
convergence criteria embodied in the Treaty, in terms of economic policy for individual Member States and 
for the European Union (EU) as a whole. Comparisons are made with other more mature federations, and a 
case for greater fiscal federalism post-1999 is presented. The paper concludes by assessing the options for 
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I.  Background and Introduction 
The historical origins of European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMIl) are rooted in political concerns arising in the aftermath of the Second World War. The idea of 
some form of future political union was embedded in the Treaty of Rome (1958), but in its early years 
the European 'common market' (as the then European Economic Community or EEC was called) 
developed almost exclusively along economic lines, mostly in the areas of constructing and then 
maintaining a customs union, and operating a pan-European agricultural policy between its members. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) required fairly stable intra-EEC exchange rates to be effective, 
so member countries adopted narrower fluctuation bands than were required by Bretton Woods. In this 
period, there was no political consensus on how or whether member countries should seek to develop 
the customs union into something more substantive. In the early 1970s, as it became clear that the 
Bretton Woods system was crumbling, attempts were made to encourage new political initiatives 
aimed at engendering an integration dynamic as part of the acquis of the community. 
    The Werner Report (1971) [which was the product of the Werner Group set up in 1969], was the 
earliest attempt to specify a more concrete plan to achieve greater monetary and economic integration 
between member countries. During the Werner Group negotiations, it became clear [see Tsoulkalis 
(1977) and De Grauwe (1990)] that two opposing groups had formed with views on strategies to attain 
EMU. These groups were labelled the 'monetarists' and the `economists', the former holding to the 
view that early progress in the monetary field would force an effective coordination of economic 
policies and the latter believed that harmonisation of economic policies should take priority before any 
coordination of Community monetary policy were embedded in the system. These two groups have 
characterised much of the debate surrounding integration in more recent discussions surrounding 
Maastricht. 
    The stability of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
post-1985 inspired confidence among a new generation of European technocrats, and encouraged new 
plane for European integration. The issuance of the Delors Report in 1989 provided new impetus 
towards monetary unification in Europe and laid out the basis for the eventual treaty for unification, 
signed in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in December 1991. The Delors Report was, in essence, a 
blueprint for a `monetarist' approach (of a gradualist kind) to EMU. 
There were two dissenting voices against the means of achieving monetary union, the UK government 
and the German government (as well as the Bundesbank). The UK government objected to the report 
on the basis that it ceded monetary sovereignty to a European monetary institution and that it implicitly 
sought the abolition of national currencies. The UK government issued two documents (HM Treasury 
(1989) and (1990)) as alternatives to the Delors plan which embodied the Hayekian parellel-currency 
principle. This approach came to be nown as the "Hard Ecu" plan. The Bundesbank's objections were 
of an 'economist' nature. The Bundesbank wanted strict criteria to be incorporated into the plan before 
countries could proceed towards monetary union and the German government also sought greater 
European political integration so that the European Central Bank could be answerable to a European 
Parliament that possessed real powers. It became clear that the "Hard Ecu" proposal, whilst it obtained 
a polite reception, was unacceptable to most of the UK's European partners. At the Inter-Governmental 
Conference in Maastricht in December of 1991, agreement was reached on a compromise that satisfied 
the Germans. This consisted of five convergence criteria to be attained before countries could proceed to monetary union. The UK, still dissatisfied, along with Denmark, which foresaw political problems 
in making the Treaty palatable to its citizens, negotiated opt-out clauses. 
    This paper evaluates the different approaches to EMU and evaluates the ramifications of pursuing 
each approach. Section II looks at the whole process of moving towards EMU and the Maastricht 
approach. Section III turns to the fiscal policy implications. Section IV takes a critical look at the 
Maastricht convergence criteria and Section V presents an assessment of the Maastricht approach and 
evaluates alternatives to Maastricht. 
 
 
II. The Road to EMU 
 
 
    All 12 States have now successfully ratified the Maastricht Treaty. The process of EMU began with 
Stage 2 of the Treaty provisions on January 1st, 1994, with the establishment of the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI). 
 
a) Generic  Approaches 
 
    There are many possible paths to attaining EMIl. Below several alternative blueprints for a path to 
EMU are explored: 
  i) 'Maastricht' approach [Time-specified/Gradualist]; 
  ii) Hayekian "Hard Ecu" approach [Competition/Gradualist]; and 
  iii) 'Hawaiian' approach [Shock]. 
    The paths can vary according to both speed of transition and route taken to the final objective, 
however the two are not mutually independent. There are two basic approaches concerning the speed at 
which a monetary union is adopted, the gradualist approach (which is essentially an approach that has 
a specified timetable, or agreed upon criteria before the next stage can begin) and the "shock-therapy" 
or 'Hawaiian' approach to achieving monetary union. The "Hard Ecu" approach is based on 
contemporaneous currency circulation, and therefore might be considered gradualist, but there is no 
certainty as to whether the process will actually yield EMU, as the process could conceivably reverse 
at any point in time. Next, the three approaches are described in more detail. 
 
i) The 'Maastricht' approach 
  The Maastricht Treaty envisioned one particular route to EMU,  
which consists of three stages, as follows: 
 
    Stage 1 (July 1, 1990 to December 31, 1993) - in this stage, the EMS abolished all 
remaining capital controls, monetary co-operation between the EC central banks was strengthened and 
realignments of the ERM were possible; 
    Stage 2 (January 1, 1994 to between January 1997 and January 1999) - in this stage, the 
EMI is established as a temporary institution to oversee transition to stage 3, all Member States will 
start the process leading to the independence of their central banks, the Commission and the EMI will 
establish whether the Member States achieve or are moving towards achieving certain criteria as 
specified in the Treaty and ERM realignments will be vigourously resisted; and 
    Stage 3 (from between January 1997 and January 1999 onwards) - in this stage, the 
exchange rates between the national currencies will be irrevocably fixed, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) will start its operations, the ECU will become a currency in its own right and will circulate as 
the only currency in EU member states that have proceeded to the third stage. 
    The Maastricht approach was to set entry conditions, the convergence criteria, and to use the ERM 
as the stepping stone from which to gradually reduce volatility until exchange rates could be fixed, 
after which a single currency could be substituted. 
 
ii)  The Hayekian "Hard Ecu" approach. 
 
  The "Hard Ecu" approach is another possible route to EMU. In  this Hayekian approach, the ECU is always devalued or revalued in line with the strongest currency in 
the EMS. This is basically the "Hard Ecu" approach put forward by the UK. Economic behaviour then 
determines the speed at which individuals give up their national currencies for the Ecu, and in the 
meantime, the two currencies circulate alongside each other. Hayek (1976a,b; 1984) argued that 
national monopolies in money supply should not be supplanted by control of Ecus by a new supra-
national monetary institution. The concurrent circulation of currencies, Hayek argued, would produce 
greater stability and restrain the abilities of individual national monetary authorities to unduly increase 
their own money supplies. The drawback here is that if national monetary authorities restrain monetary 
creation, then this evolutionary-competition approach might not lead to the outcome of all national 
currencies being replaced by the Ecu, so that the "means" might not achieve the "end" as envisaged in 
the Maastricht Treaty. One of the advantages of this approach, however, would be that criteria for 
entry into EMU would be unnecessary, so 'economist' concerns would be placated. 
 
iii) The 'Hawaiian' approach 
 
    The 'Hawaiian' approach is one of moving directly to EMU in contrast to the gradualist approach. 
(The Hawaiian secession into the United States occurred in a single step, with appropriate legislation 
being adopted simultaneously with adoption of the U.S. dollar). Prior to the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Hawaiian approach was favoured by several leading European economists (see Giovannini 
(1990), for example). It is highly unlikely to be feasible in a European context, as the political 
prerequisites for this approach, as illustrated in Germany in the case of German Economic, Monetary, 
and Social Union (GEMSU), are draconian. It would therefore be unacceptable to most Member States, 
and furthermore, it would likely be impractical, as the European institutions to oversee such a 
transition are insufficiently developed. 
    The transition to monetary union, as Fratianni, Von Hagen and Waller (1992a) point out, could 
potentially involve 'end games', in that "participants know that a particular arrangement will stop at a 
certain time and that they can influence their relative wealth or income positions in the subsequent 
arrangement by taking certain actions under the current one". An example would be seigniorage 
distribution - if this distribution in the new regime depended on the relative size of national monetary 
bases, each government would have an incentive to increase money growth to secure a higher 
seigniorage share. End games can be discouraged by either keeping the timing of the final transition 
unspecified or by setting entry conditions. This likely explains why, in practice, the 'Hawaiian' 
approach has tended to incorporate an element of surprise, as a specified transition date could 
encourage fiscal profligacy and a distortion of economic behaviour in the period before the currency 
conversion occurs. 
 
  b) The Transition Process 
 
  Whatever approach is chosen to get to EMU, there are various 
  questions as to the component parts of the transition process. In 
  this instance, there are five issues that need to be addressed: 
  i) Should monetary union be accompanied by a further 
  significant increase in economic convergence?; 
  ii) Should EMU be accompanied by national currency stability?; 
  iii) Should the EMU process incorporate a role for national 
  central banks, and if so, what should it be?; 
  iv) Should some form of fiscal federalism be developed in the 
  transition to help Europe's periphery shoulder regional 
 shocks?;  and 
  v) Should EU monetary institutions be developed before EMU 
  eventually occurs, and if so how? 
  Each of the generic approaches described in the previous section     has different 
responses to these questions, and these are       summarised in table i. 
 
 
      TABLE  1  
      The Transition Process to EMU 
 Maastricht  Hard  Ecu  Hawaiian 
i)  Economic convergence?  Yes  No  No 
ii) Currency stability? Yes  No  No 
iii)National bank role?  Independent     Yes  None 
iv) Fiscal federalism? Minimal          Yes        (Yes) 
v)  EU monetary authorities?  EMI     Yes   Yes 
 
In table 1, three specific examples of the three possible approaches to EMU have been given. 
Maastricht's answer to the role of National central banks is unclear, but central bank independence is a 
priority and with the degree of fiscal federalism there is a limit of 1.27% of EU GDP (for 1999) in the 
stipulated projections for the EU budget. The 'Hawaiian' approach does not need any convergence, but 
requires complete cooperation on the part of the National central banks and also may require some 
resource transfer depending upon the rate at which the conversion is made. The "Hard Ecu" approach 
requires no economic convergence or currency stability but for National central banks to play a role in 
determining the speed at which the transition occurs, and indeed, whether it occurs at all. Some fiscal 
redistribution may be required for the "Hard Ecu" approach, as regional shocks may endanger the 
efficacy of national fiscal policies due to the legal ability to substitute national currency for Ecus. 
    The irony is that to date, the convergence criteria specified in Maastricht will probably not be met by 
any of the Member States excepting Luxembourg (see De Grauwe and Gros (1991) and Financial 
Times (1993a, 1994c)), and most member states are operating, if at all, under exceptionally wide 
fluctuation bands in the ERM (this is unlikely to change following recent evidence EMI President Mr. 
Lamfalussy gave to the European Parliament (see Financial Times (1994b)). The role of National 
central banks is a moot point with many European governments (notably the UK and France) and the 
degree of fiscal federalism as envisaged under the Edinburgh plan has been attacked as inadequate (see 
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991)). Only the development of EU monetary authorities appears to be on 
track, with the EMI established as the pre-cursor to the ECB. 
 
c)  Currency Stabilisation and the Role of the EMS 
 
  The Maastricht Treaty (Council of the European Communities       (1992)) 
specifically states that Member States should observe:     "the normal fluctuation margins 
provided  for  by  the       exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System, for at     least two years, without devaluing against the currency of any  
  other Member State" (Article 109j, indent 3). 
By 'normal', the Treaty implies the +/-2.25% margins in operation at the time that the Treaty was 
signed (exceptions were made for Italy and for any new participants in the ERM). Although to 'no 
devaluation over a certain time period' clause is clearly arbitrary, it actually serves little real purpose. 
The real objective should be to ensure that when the Member State joins EMU, it does so such that its 
currency is at a sustainable level   for the longer term. 
    The Maastricht formula of enforcing fiscal, monetary and exchange rate criteria may, in certain 
circumstances, not be entirely compatible, or indeed, consistent with the overall objectives of EMU. 
For example, consider an economy where the economic variables for the convergence criteria are 
approaching their appropriate levels. If a transitory shock hits the economy, which in turn causes a 
lengthening of the expected period of time before entry into stage 3 of EMU was anticipated, this 
might lead to some turbulence in the foreign exchange markets. Central bank action to offset such 
turbulence (by increasing interest rates, for example), might only exacerbate the situation in terms of 
the economic criteria, further altering expectations. Hence, because of the limited room for manoevre 
in the foreign exchange market, transitory shocks can permanently affect expectations, even when it is 
known ex-post that they are transitory. As the ERM of the EMS operates around the Ecu, which is 
itself a weighted basket of the EMS currencies, the room for manoevre with a given transitory shock 
must be proportionate to the weight the currency has in the Ecu basket. 
    In a more general sense, though, the use of the ERM of the EMS to achieve EMU is confusing an 
adjustable-peg exchange rate regime which is very effective when used as an independent volatility-reducing mechanism, with a criteria-dependent dynamic process to move the EC towards a monetary 
union. The two are mutually incompatible on many levels. 
    The potential incompatibility of the ERM objective with the convergence criteria has not been 
observed in practice to date (partly because the margins of fluctuation are now extremely wide at +/-
15%), but a similar event in the recent history of the ERM of the EMS serves to illustrate the point. In 
the sumner of 1992, first Denmark surprisingly voted not to ratify the Maastricht Treaty (announced on 
June 3), and then it appeared that France, in particular, would not ratify the Maastricht Treaty in a 
country-wide referendum. These setbacks, especially if repeated elsewhere, would not render the 
Maastricht Treaty timetable completely unworkable (although some doubts were expressed by legal 
experts at the time), but it was widely perceived that this could cause a delay in the EMU process, if 
not a partial renegotiation of various sections of the Treaty protocols, or at worse a two-speed EMU 
process. Here, speculative attacks on various currencies occurred (including the French franc), due to 
increased uncertainty over the French and other referendum outcomes. This probably acted as a 
transitory shock would have, creating turbulence in the foreign exchange market and large-scale short-
term capital flows. These events and proposed explanations for them are chronicled in detail by 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993). 
 
 
III. Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
    Fiscal federalism is discussed in a branch of the public finance literature which deals with the 
assigning of different expenditure and tax/transfer competences to different levels of government (see 
Oates (1972)). Much of this literature assumes a static economy, so in a sense it is not applicable to 
EMU. Further, it says little about interregional income redistribution and regional stabilisation, so 
lacks the ability to deal with the dynamic issue of whether such disparities and asymmetries should be 
addressed as Member States move towards a more federalist structure. It does, however, have one 
important implication for EMU, which has been enshrined in Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
 
a) The Subsidiarity Principle 
 
    Subsidiarity stipulates that a higher level of government 
should only assume responsibilities that cannot be taken care of effectively by a lower level of 
government. Implicit in this principle is a preference for national autonomy in regulation, so 
coordination, in terms of for example the formation of committees is assumed preferable to 
harmonisation or centralisation (see Centre for Economic Policy (1991)). Harmonisation is seen as a 
last resort, once attempts to coordinate policies between Member States has failed. In all federalist 
structures there is always a tension between subsidiarity and harmonisation. In theoretical economic 
terms these competences are normally well specified, but in practical terms the line is very grey indeed. 
    Several questions arise here, notably: what are the reasons for attempting to implement the 
subsidiarity principle in practice, and to what extent might the principle of subsidiarity confound the 
attainment and the effects of EMU? 
    In answer to the question of why the subsidiarity principle should be used as a competence 
assignment criterion, Courchene et al. (1993) provide three arguments as follows: 
i) national differences in needs and tastes; 
    ii) better democratic control of public services at a national      level; 
and 
   iii)  decentralised  supply of public goods and services     
  encourages competition and innovation between national      
 authorities. 
The first of these arguments, in the EU context, is certainly not in dispute: it is the European reality. 
The second reason reflects the 
notion that decentralised decision-making brings government 'closer to the people' (see Tresch (1981)). 
The third argument is somewhat controversial, however, as it assumes that a sufficient degree of labour 
and capital (or corporate) mobility exists between Member States. Certainly, since 1993, the free movement of labour and capital following the implementation of the single market is possible, but 
cultural and linguistic differences inevitably inhibit labour mobility and other factors such as natural 
resource availability constrain the movement of firms between Member States. 
    Even if the third reason cited above (increased competition between national authorities) for the 
subsidiarity principle is set aside, the principle could be justified on the basis of the first two reasons. 
But in what circumstances should competences either be coordinated or passed to a supranational level 
of government, according to the principle of subsidiarity? In 1977, the MacDougall Report was 
published (Commission of the European Community (1977)) which "examined the criteria for 
assigning functions to the different levels of a multi-tier government" (Plender (1991)). The report 
identified 4 rationales for assigning competences, in addition to that of the principle of subsidiarity. 
These are: 
i) cross-border spill-over effects of national policies that give   rise to externalities; 
  ii) economies of scale and/or indivisibilities in national 
 policies;  and 
  iii) the pursuit of homogeneity and/or fairness.  
With spill-over effects, the more integrated economies grow, the 
greater these spill-over effects are likely to be. For economies of scale and/or indivisibilities, efficiency 
gains are cited as the benefit. The pursuit of homogeneity and/or fairness (often termed "national 
standards" in Canada), however, is the most controversial. In terms of the homogeneity argument, this 
justification has been already caused much debate within Europe following claims that the European 
Commission has not been following the subsidiarity principle and has initiated directives in areas 
where it has no competence (for example, sausages, garden implements and beer!). 
    In terms of the notion of fairness, this brings into play the whole issue of regional disparities, and the 
fiscal competencies of the EU. This issue is crucial, as it is in this realm that the principle of 
subsidiarity could conceivably confound EMU. 
 
b) Regional Disparities 
 
    The political tension between those gaining and losing in a federalist structure is normally justified 
by the economic principles of fiscal federalism. The principle here is often called the 'resource flow' 
principle - that is, the flow of resources should flow from richer to poorer Member States. Hence 
regional disparities might be expected to diminish in a federalist structure. But the degree of political 
homogeneity is clearly a factor in the perceived desirability for the extent of 'resource flow', even if 
such economic benefits in terms of overall welfare improvement could be convincingly demonstrated. 
The experience of federations such as the USA, Australia and Canada is that language and cultural 
  similarities and factor mobility engender a much greater level of acceptance for 'resource flow' in 
general and more specifically regional income redistribution. Table 2 details recent estimates regarding 
inter-regional income redistribution in the US, Canada and Australia. 
 
 
      TABLE  2 
  Estimates of Competence Specialisation in Selected Federal 
    throuqh  A  Centralised  Budget 
 
Country Expenditure Revenue 
 Centralisation  Centralisation 
USA 76.5%  68.0% 
Canada 50.6%  50.3% 
Australia 80.4%  74.4% 
Switzerland 61.9%  55.6% 
Belgium 93.5%  93.1% 
Germany 70.0%  61.9% 
 
  Notes:   i) All figures are for 1988, with the exception 
    of  Switzerland,  1984. 
      ii) 'Expenditure Centralisation' is consolidated       central government expenditure as a proportion of 
      consolidated central government plus other state 
    spending:  IMF  Government  Statistics. 
      iii) 'Revenue Centralisation' is tax revenue and      
  social security contributions to consolidated central 
      government relative to total tax and social 
      security revenue of consolidated governments: IMF 
    Government  Statistics. 
 
    In the above table, all mature federations are shown to have a substantial degree of expenditure and 
revenue centralisation. Most of these countries are unilingual, bilingual, or trilingual at most, which 
suggests that linguistic and cultural differences might be a major impetus for the acceptability of 
resource flows, as compared with the EU. 
 
c) Budqetary Fairness and Convergence under Maastricht 
 
    As Courchene et al (1993) point out, "there is an inverse relationship between State public finance 
autonomy and interregional redistribution". This claim directly follows from the fact that the capacity 
for interregional redistribution depends ceteris paribus on the size of the federal budget relative to the 
budgets of the Member States. There are, therefore, in any federation, winners (the poorer Member 
States) and losers (the richer ones) - this is usually referred to in political terms as "fairness in the 
supra-national budgetary process". In fact, the acrimonious juste retour debate in Europe was triggered 
by this specific issue in relation to the UK, and although it was corrected with the UK abatement 
declaration' at the Fontainebleau Summit (1984), the issue of "fairness" in terms of net contribution to 
the EU is still a major issue in many Member States. In most mature federations "fairness" is also an 
elusive concept in budgetary politics, as certain expenditures cannot generally be apportioned on a 
regional basis. 
    This naturally leads to a discussion of the nature of convergence within a more federal EU structure. 
Given no interregional income distribution, there are two views here on whether convergence will 
occur in an economic union - the most well known often being labelled the 'convergence hypothesis'. 
The convergence hypothesis states that spatial disparities will tend to disappear under an economic 
union due to international trade, capital flows and labour mobility. The opposing view stresses the 
existence of imperfect competition, economies of scale and externalities and so asserts that 
convergence in an economic union will be deflected due to 'cumulative causation' processes (see 
Prud'homme (1993)). Clearly, even if international trade has no additional effects in the EU, inter-
regional income redistributions must be sufficiently large enough to offset any 'cumulative causation' 
processes for economic convergence to occur. 
    The whole notion of budgetary fairness is therefore congruent to that of economic convergence. But 
economic convergence in reality under Maastricht is a moot issue, as the loss of two economic policy 
levers (monetary and exchange rate policies) leaves only two other levers (national fiscal policies and 
the EU budge= itself). This could limit national governments when responding to asymmetric shocks 
and could potentially discourage convergence. The outcome logically depends upon the relative 
phasing of business cycles between each Member State and the ability of national governments and the 
European Commission through the EU budget, to respond through fiscal means. 
    Concerning the role of the EU budget, the medium term evolution of the EU budget was decided by 
EU leaders at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992. The budget will grow from just under 1.2% of EU GDP 
to a limit of 1.7% of EU GDP by 1999, coincidental with the last date that stage 3 of EMU can begin. 
Furthermore, it was decided that the Commission would be denied fiscal sovereignty (the ability to 
raise taxes independently of national governments) and would continue to raise most of its resources 
by a 'surcharge' on indirect taxes (VAT) collected by Member States. This is in addition to the legal 
prohibition from running a deficit and the highly discretionary nature of outlays, with more than 80% 
being directed to the Common Agricultural Policy or regional development. The inability to raise 'own 
resources' and to operate inter-personal income transfers, when compared to other more fiscally-
sovereign federalist structures, is unique to Europe. This suggests that the reason that the EC budget is 
so miniscule in comparison with other more mature federations might be because of the political unacceptability of regional income redistribution and the associated addition of tax competencies to a 
centralised federal administration. 
    The fact that there will be little interregional income redistribution in the EC suggests that the ties 
binding the Member States together will be far less substantial and resilient than for countries in table 
2. The reality of this fact spawns a whole series of corollaries, but most poignantly that the Member 
States will need a great deal of fiscal latitude to deal with regional- or industry-specific disturbances 
and shocks, given that both monetary sovereignty and the exchange rate instrument will no longer be 
available to Member States. 
    It should be noted that one other economic valve for responding to asymmetric shocks, ex post, is 
through labour migration. As has already been noted, cultural and linguistic differences (as well as 
inter-regional transfers themselves) tend to inhibit the rate of migration to high growth regions, as has 
been observed in Canada and Switzerland. 
    As the EU budget cannot support compensatory redistributive initiatives to alleviate the effects of 
asymmetric shocks, this leaves, in extremis, national fiscal policies as the only policy lever available. 
 
 
IV.  The Maastricht Convergence Criteria 
 
 
The Maastricht convergence criteria have a dual purpose. As stage 3 of EMU approaches, economies 
should maintain a convergent path, not only in a monetary sphere, but also with respect to fiscal 
policies. Convergence criteria also deflect any concerns that national governments might participate in 
'end games'. Convergence criteria, then, are a useful way of facilitating a smooth transition period to 
EMIl, with explicit objectives, as well as a complementing the increased fixity of exchange rates 
envisaged for the EMS. The pertinent question is not the desirability of convergence criteria per se, but 
rather which criteria are relevant, practicable and suitable to reflect convergence of the economic 
variables that will best ensure the least onerous path to EMU. Any critical assessment of the criteria 
should pursue this line of inquiry, given that the criteria have already been selected and defined by the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
 
a) The Criteria 
 
Economic convergence criteria are laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. This is unique to Europe, and is 
politically a recognitionof the 'economists' approach to monetary union. The criteria are as follows 
(Article 109j): 
  i) Price Stability - an annual average rate of inflation      that does not exceed by 
more than 1.5% that of, at most,       the three best performing Member States; 
  ii) Interest Rates - observed over a period of one year,       a Member State 
has had an average nominal long-term         interest rate on government bonds 
that does not exceed by     more than 2% that of, at most, the three best performing  
    Member States in terms of price stability; 
  iii) Government Deficits - the deficit should not exceed       3% for the ratio 
of the planned or actual government         deficit to gross domestic product at 
market prices; and       iv) Government Debt - the debt should not exceed 60% for  
    the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product     at market prices; 
and 
  v) ERM - a Member State has respected the "normal"      
  fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate       mechanism of the 
EMS without severe tensions for at least     the last 2 years before the examination; it 
should not       have devalued its currency within the mechanism during    
 this  period. 
 
    Due to the extraordinary events of 1992, criteria v) has essentially been dropped by the EMI. (A 
kinder interpretation might be that it has been "re-interpreted"). Much has been written on these criteria, 
and in particular, the fiscal criteria iii) and iv) have been the focus of much attention (see Goodhart (1991), Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), Langfeldt (1992), Papadia and Schioppa (1993) and 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (1991), among others). 
  The first two criteria are very well specified, and make economic sense in the context of the 
economic circumstances prevailing when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. If stable exchange rates 
are to be achieved, then inflation convergence in terms of tradable goods would be advantageous. In 
terms of criteria ii) (long-term interest rates), high intra-EC capital mobility combined with criteria v) 
(the ERM) would imply that long-term interest rate differentials would only occur with differential 
default risk. Eliminating such differential risk may be the motivation behind criteria iii) (government 
deficits) and iv) (government debt). As criteria i) (inflation rates) and ii) (long-term interest rates) are 
only entry conditions they appear to be sensible, not only because they are defined in relative terms, 
but also because they closely link the entry conditions so as to be dynamically consistent with the final 
objective. Criteria iii) and iv) (government deficits and debt, respectively), in contrast, are absolute 
objectives that, inter alia, bear little relation to the eventual objective. They are, however, linked with 
the section in the treaty dealing with the coordination of national policies (Articles 102a and 103). 
Table 3 summarises the Maastricht criteria. 
 
      TABLE  3   
    The  Maastricht  Convergence  Criteria 
Criteria Nature  Entry 
   Condition? 
 
i) Inflation rate  Relative Entry 
ii) Interest rate  Relative Entry 
iii) Govt. deficit  Static  Continuing 
iv) Govt. debt  Static  Continuing 
v) ERM  Relative Entry 
 
It should be noted that the ERM conditions are really a 'relative' criteria because the Ecu itself is a 
basket of all EMS currencies, and further, although the ERM may continue after stage 3 of EMU 
begins, as soon as all Member States adopt the Ecu, the ERM will cease to exist. Also, and most 
importantly here, the fiscal criteria would not be relaxed but act as a measure for ensuring that Article 
104c(1) ("Member States shall avoid excessive deficits") of the Maastricht Treaty is not transgressed. 
 
b) Fiscal Policy and EMU 
 
      Are the two fiscal criteria sensible as entry conditions, in other words are they attainable 
objectives for Member States objectives by 19997 It is widely recognised that most EC Member States 
are far from achieving these objectives; Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993) have estimated what 
constant % deficit-GDP ratio would have to be maintained to cut the debt-GDP ratio to 60% under 
various scenarios, and find that the results for Belgium, Italy and Ireland are unrealistically punitive 
and "describe the economics of the lunatic asylum". The implication being that these criteria are not 
realistic entry conditions for EMU. 
  In the context of a monetary union, are fiscal criteria desirable in terms of the credibility of the 
union and the stance of overall fiscal policy for a Member State? The need for such criteria or rules 
was set out originally in a paper by Lamfalussy (1989); the most pertinent of the reasons for such 
criteria are as follows: 
  -  the desirability of an appropriate fiscal policy for the 
    union as a whole; 
  -  the need to avoid disproportionate use of Community 
    savings by one country; and 
  -  a possible bias towards lack of fiscal restraint. 
 
    The desirability of a pan-European fiscal policy, as far as Goodhart (1991) is concerned, is the least 
contentious reason for fiscal EMU criteria, but reference to other mature federations suggests that the 
second two reasons are unlikely consequences of abandoning fiscal criteria.   Lamfalussy recognises, in the second case, that this (disproportionate use of Community savings) 
could only occur "if a particular government encountered refinancing difficulties" which caused the EC 
to "bail out the government in financial trouble" (p.96). But the Treaty (Article 104b) makes it very 
clear that the Community or any other "Member State shall be liable for or assume the commitments of 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law or 
public undertakings of another Member State". The other circumstance that Lamfalussy gives for this 
need is if excessive borrowing by one Member State raised the interest rate level throughout the 
Community, causing crowding out in countries where the interest rate would have been lower. But, 
market risk premia should act to reflect the size of debt and ability to repay debts. Lamfalussy points to 
the fact that governments are not subject to the same market discipline as companies are when 
participating in the debt market, and in addition he stresses the situation where the financial markets 
might expect a higher level of government to bail out a lower level of government ( - the example of 
New York is used here). But in political terms this argument makes no sense. In the EU, with the 
exception of perhaps some "olive belt" Member States, the mere idea of defaulting on sovereign debt 
would have economic and political consequences that are much too horrendous to imagine for most 
governments. 
    As for a bias towards a lack of fiscal restraint, the example that Lamfalussy uses here is the 
restraining of regional government expenditure, particularly in the case of Italy. But he readily 
acknowledges that "the available evidence from federal systems would not seem to suggest a bias 
towards lack of fiscal restraint" and cites Canada and the US, where evidence confirms that markets 
differentiate between the various regions as regards credit risk. He then states that "it remains unclear, 
however, what are the factors ultimately accounting for the apparent lack of a bias (towards lack of 
fiscal restraint) in the states examined. This raises doubts about the extent to which their experience 
can be of guidance for foreseeable conditions within a European EMU." (italics added to clarify). To 
deny that the power of the democratic political process in combination with the financial markets is 
sufficient to ensure fiscal rectitude on the part of Member State governments or ultimately a change in 
government, is to question the compatibility of a market-based economy with democracy.  If this 
compatibility is questioned, there is still no philosophical  reason to choose to reject something just 
because the situation in 
which it is to be applied might be different from the norm. From a 
logical perspective imposing such criteria before the fact would,  therefore, also seem to be 
inappropriate. 
    In addition, the Maastricht Treaty is very specific that debt   is not to be monetised 
(Article 104(1)). Many Member States that   currently enjoy the ability to monetise debt would 
thus have this  avenue removed, and would therefore be more restricted in their   ability to 
be fiscally irresponsible. Issuing debt appears to be  the only route available for Member States 
post-stage 3. 
In summary, therefore, there is apparently no reasonable economic rationale for fiscal entry conditions 
or national fiscal policy criteria after EMU is achieved, as has been defined in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The following section discusses dynamic aspects of the fiscal criteria in the transition period to stage 3. 
 
c) Dynamic "let-outs" 
    
  As the fiscal criteria pose almost insurmountable problems for several EU Member States (notably 
Italy, Belgium and Greece), 'let-out' clauses were added into the Maastricht Treaty to enable these 
Member States to participate in EMU even though they might not meet all the specified criteria. The 
Excessive Deficit Procedure laid out in the Treaty specifies that: 
  "The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary       situation 
and of the stock of government debt in the Member States     with a view to identifying 
gross errors. In particular it shall       examine compliance with budgetary 
discipline on the basis of the       following two criteria: 
  a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to   gross domestic product 
exceeds a reference value, unless either the   ratio has declined substantially and continuously and 
reached a       level that comes close to the reference value: 
  or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only       exceptional and 
temporary and the ratio remains close to the       reference value;   b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product     exceeds a 
reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently       diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a           satisfactory pace." (Article 104c(2)) 
Firstly, note that it is the Commission that is enjoined to identify whether Member States have 
committed "gross errors". "Gross errors" clearly refer to whether the reference levels defined in the 
criteria have been transgressed, but a further arbitrary dynamic component has been overlaid onto 
these absolute measures to provide "let-cuts" for certain Member States. 
 
    Secondly, note that most emphasis is placed on the government 
deficit criteria, as if countries run primary surpluses, then total debt logically falls by definition. Of the 
high debt countries (as noted recently in Financial Times (1994c)), Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands all had significant primary surpluses in 1993. Belgium, Italy and Greece all had debt ratios 
in excess of 100 per cent of GDP for 1993 and the Netherlands and Ireland all had debt ratios in excess 
of 80 per cent of GDP for the same year. 
    These dynamic "let-out" clauses are extremely flexible due to 
their generic nature and the fact that the Commission, hardly a disinterested party, will decide when 
and where "gross errors" occur. These subtleties have a further implication: it is clearly in a Member 
State's best interests to strive to meet as many of the entry conditions to EMU as possible in order to 
enter stage 3, but these dynamic "let-out" clauses make little sense once EMU is achieved. Given the 
loss of monetary and exchange rate policy levers on entering stage 3, Member States will have little 
incentive to abide by the fiscal discipline endemic in the dynamic "let-out" clauses in the longer term: 
the business cycle coupled with the insipid penalties that the Council could impose upon Member 
States (Article 104c(11)) would provide enough reason not to 'stay the course'. 
  So, in brief, there is no economic rationale for the fiscal policy criteria as entry or continuing 
criteria, but given the criteria remain in force, it makes little sense to continue with dynamic "let-out" 
clauses after stage 3 begins. 
 
d)  Credibility Issues 
 
  Excessive flexibility in applying the fiscal policy criteria, 
both pre- and post-entry into stage 3 of EMU, as well as the abandonment of the narrow margins of 
fluctuation for the ERM of the EMS may lead to a lack of credibility in the whole EMU process, 
particularly in light of the significant changes that have taken place in Europe since the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
    In terms of exchange rate fluctuations, the Maastricht Treaty states that the criterion should be that a 
"Member State has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the ERM of the EMS 
without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination" by the European Council 
(Protocol on the Convergence Criteria, Article 3). Following the exchange rate turbulence in the latter 
half of 1992, Italy and the UK left the ERM and all members, with the exception of the Netherlands, 
widened their fluctuation bands to +/-15% from the previous "narrow" bands of +/-2.25%. So now, 
application of this criteria hinges upon the interpretation of what is "normal". A +/-15% fluctuation 
margin is not "normal" when put in context with the last 15 years of the operation of the ERM of the 
EMS, and is tantamount to operating a quasi-flexible exchange rate policy. So if the European Council 
decides to interpret "normal" as +/-15%, then this renders this exchange-rate convergence criteria as 
effectively redundant (see Financial Times (1994b,c)). The economic policy implication of such an 
interpretation is that exchange rate policy then becomes a policy lever that can be used by Member 
States in the transition period to stage 3 of EMU. 
    In order to enter into stage 3 of EMU, many Member States will be relying on an application of the 
looser dynamic "let-out" clauses rather than a strict interpretation of the fiscal convergence criteria. 
    The design of the EMU process in the form of its original blueprint, relied heavily on the credibility 
of the ERM of the EMS to achieve convergence and a reasonable degree of price stability (which in 
turn would narrow interest-rate differentials). Without this exchange rate policy anchor, the whole 
process of EMU becomes arbitrary. The potential for conflict and an over-riding reliance on the degree 
of emphasis placed on the Commission's decisions as to what is "excessive" becomes operative, which 
may potentially give Member State governments an incentive to adopt various expedient policies during the transition period. The argument here is similar to that of dynamic inconsistency (see Barro 
and Gordon (1983)). 
    But notwithstanding the above argument, abandonment of the ERM of the EMS could potentially 
lead to other problems: why should inflation rates converge to within 1.5% of the lowest inflation rates 
in the EU?. Each Member State's inflation rate will be determined by indigenous monetary policy, not, 
as previously, by the exogeneity of an external exchange rate constraint. Similarly, interest rates need 
not converge, as the removal of the exchange rate constraint will lead to more divergent risk premiums. 
 
    In summary, the convergence criteria, as currently devised, do not, in the present circumstances, 
represent a consistent set of objectives (or 'means') for achieving the ultimate objective (or 'end') of 
EMU. If anything, the Maastricht convergence criteria represent obstacles to the attainment of EMU, 
and will almost certainly ensure that the peripheral Member States have to tread a path of 'greatest 
resistance' to get to the desired objective. 
 
 
V. The Maastricht Treaty and Evaluation of Feasible Alternatives 
 
 
    The Maastricht Treaty is a reality, but EMU is not yet cast in stone. When a review of the progress 
towards achieving EMU occurs at the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) scheduled for 1996, the 
Maastricht Treaty may not be annulled without significant procedural problems, and with the exception 
of the UK, there is little will in the Union to take this route. (For an economic perspective in favour of 
scrapping EMU altogether, see De Grauwe (1994)). 
 
a)   A Critical Assessment of Maastricht  
    The virtual abandonment of the ERM of the EMS makes "the transition strategy to monetary union 
devised in the Maastricht Treaty impracticable" (De Grauwe (1994)). The objective of Maastricht was 
to replace the current arrangements in the EU with a monetary union and a weak federalist structure, 
but with restrictions on regional fiscal autonomy. This combination of objectives is inconsistent, given 
the experience of other federal structures and given existing economic theory. 
    Economic theory has little to say about transition to a monetary union, but it does have something to 
say about optimum currency areas. In optimum currency areas, the monetary union works best when 
there is a flexible labour force with a significant level of mobility so as to offset any asymmetric 
shocks. Further, in optimum currency areas, some form of fiscal redistributive process should be in 
place to enhance cohesion among the participants. 
    Economic theory aside, transition processes should not be dependent on criteria. The example of 
GEMSU reinforces this point. German monetary union was not dependent on economic criteria but 
was justified solely on political and social grounds. In Germany, once monetary union was achieved, 
then the process of economic convergence began, albeit with severe economic distress in some regions, 
and despite objections from 'economist' viewpoints at the Bundesbank. The economic dislocation in 
Germany, one might argue, was minimised by a well-educated and mobile labour force in the former 
East Germany (in addition to the fact that East Germans speak the same language as West Germans), 
and this would not be mirrored in Europe as a whole (consider the Portuguese, for example). 
    But arguments about labour mobility miss the point. To refute arguments that economic criteria are 
necessary to achieve a monetary union, one only has to consider objectives: was the ultimate objective 
to achieve monetary union or to foster convergence? If the ultimate objective is to achieve monetary 
union, then it is relatively easy to implement in one rapid ('Hawaiian') step. If the objective is to 
achieve economic convergence in the Union, then an adjustable-peg exchange rate regime with fiscal 
transfers is probably the easiest route (as envisaged in the original Delors Report). If the ultimate 
objective is both monetary union and economic convergence, then it is far easier to implement 
monetary union and then strive for economic convergence than vice-versa. As the objectives of EMU 
are by definition both economic and monetary union, then it seems sensible to adopt a 'monetarist' 
approach. The only issue then becomes how you get to monetary union (i.e. the rate of conversion for 
national currencies to the Ecu). Economic convergence prior to monetary union virtually disqualifies 
the poorer, more inflation-prone Member States of the Union from attaining EMU for some years to come, and favours the richer, less inflation-prone Member States. In this sense, the Maastricht Treaty 
has put the cart before the horse. 
    If the Maastricht convergence criteria are collectively inconsistent and furthermore are unlikely to 
be of help in advancing EMU for all but a few Member States, it is unclear from an economic 
perspective as to why the architects of Maastricht chose this particular combination of timetabling and 
economic criteria. The combination was probably the result of political 'horse-trading' and ad-hocery. 
Indeed, Frankel (1993) suggests that the treaty may be a modern-day economic version of the 
mythological notion of the quest (for example, Jason of the Argonauts) with the fiscal criteria as the 
object of the quest and EMU the prize. Under this interpretation, the object could either be a test of 
will or a 'Machiavellian plot' on the part of the Bundesbank to torpedo the plans for EMU altogether! 
    Table 4 below shows which Member States currently satisfy the Maastricht criteria, as of April 1995. 
 
      TABLE  4 
    Which EU Members States Satisfy the Maastricht 
Member State   i) Inflation   ii) Interest   iii) Budget   iv) Public 
                  rate            rates           deficit      debt 
Belgium Yes Yes No  No 
Denmark  Yes Yes No  No 
Germany  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Greece No No No No 
Spain  No No No No 
France  Yes Yes No  Yes 
Ireland  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Italy  No No No No 
Luxembourg  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Netherlands  Yes Yes No  No 
Portugal  No No No No 
United  Kingdom  Yes Yes No  Yes 
 
 Source:  EMI  (1995) 
 
    In the following sections feasible alternatives to Maastricht are presented: firstly in terms of 
amendments to the current treaty that might address the problems cited above while retaining the 
whole notion of gradualist approach to EMU, and secondly in terms of replacing sections of the Treaty 
with other viable alternatives. 
 
b) Amending the Treaty 
 
    The original Delors Report (Committee on Economic and Monetary Union (1989)) proposed a 
strategy for EMU based on two axioms (as Fratianni, von Hagen and Waller (1992b) identify), 
'parallelism' and  
the use of the EMS as the launching pad for the process. The principle of parallelism states that EMU 
"form two integral parts (economic union and monetary union) of a single whole and would therefore 
have to be implemented in parallel" (para. 21, parentheses added). The justification for parallelism in 
the Delors Report is that "monetary union is only conceivable if a high degree of economic 
convergence is attained" (para. 21). But the report does not really distinguish the process of economic 
convergence with the attainment of the state of economic union, in terms of linking monetary union 
with the aims of a single market (supposedly attained at the beginning of 1993). Monetary union 
clearly enhances the benefits of a single market, but without sufficient fiscal latitude for Member 
States or fiscal sovereignty at the EU level, the process of economic union will take a much longer 
time to run its course. So the modifications to the Maastricht Treaty that, following the assessment 
above, would avert a "two-speed" EMU process and make the treaty workable in economic terms, are 
ones that enhance convergence, but do not impose a "no-entry" clause for those countries unlikely to 
meet the static fiscal criteria nor appeal to subjective 'dynamic' criteria. The proposed possible options 
for modification of the treaty are measured against Maastricht as is, and a slight hardening of the 
Maastricht conditions. They are as follows: i) drop the dynamic fiscal criteria and retain all other     fiscal criteria with no alterations to 
projected EU         budgets and allow for a multi-speed EMU; or 
    ii) maintain all fiscal criteria with no alterations to     projected EU budgets and 
allow for a multi-speed EMU; or 
iii)  drop the fiscal criteria altogether with no         alterations  to 
projected EU budgets; or 
iv) drop the dynamic fiscal criteria, drop the debt ntry     condition but maintain the budget 
deficit entry        condition, drop the fiscal conditions post entry into    
  stage 3, and slightly increase the EU budget; or 
v) drop the dynamic fiscal criteria, drop the debt        condition (both as entry 
and post entry), maintain the       budget deficit criterion (as both an entry condition 
and    as a post-entry into stage 3 condition), and moderately     increase the EU 
budget; or 
vi) drop the debt entry condition, maintain the budget       deficit criterion (both as 
an entry condition and as a       post-entry into stage 3 condition), maintain the debt  
    condition post-entry into stage 3 and substantially         increase 
the EU budget and increase fiscal competences;    or 
    vii) drop all entry conditions, but maintain post-entry    into stage 3 conditions, 
and substantially increase the     EU budget and increase EU fiscal policy competences. 
    The 7 options are summarised below in table 5. 
 
      TABLE  5 
      Options for Modifying Maastricht 
 
                Drop      Drop      Drop      Drop 
       Drop     Deficit   Deficit   Debt      Debt                2-  
       Dynamic  Criteria  Criteria  Criteria  Criteria    EU      Speed   Option Criteria Pre       Post      Pre       
Post        Budget  EMU    
 
i)       Yes       No          No        No         No            Same   Yes 
ii)       No       No          No       No          No           Same   Yes 
iii)     Yes    Yes       Yes      Yes        Yes          Same  No/Yes 
iv)      Yes     No       Yes        Yes        Yes            +    (No) 
v)       Yes     No        No      Yes        Yes           ++    (No) 
vi)       No       No        No      Yes         No          +++     No 
vii)      No    Yes        No      Yes         No          +++     No 
   i 
 
    For all seven options, several other permanent alterations to the treaty are recognised. These are 
firstly, either the abandonment of the narrow bands of the ERM of the EMS as an entry criteria, which 
probably heralds a death-knell for the ERM, as in fact has happened (a view which was originally 
espoused by the 'MIT6', a group of academic economists from the MIT - see Financial Times (1993b)), 
or the imposition of appropriate measures to allow the ERM to operate under narrow bands again (such 
as capital controls or a tax on foreign exchange rate transactions - see Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) 
on this point). Secondly, there may have to be some change in the timetable for EMU - a 1999 
inception for stage 3 would appear more appropriate in the light of recent events, but much depends on 
the progress of Germany and how the "dynamic" fiscal conditions are to be interpreted. 
    The first option (option i)) would accept all the Maastricht 
criteria, but would drop the dynamic 'let-out' clauses, and would therefore substantially elongate the 
period of time over which stage 3 is in force. It has been suggested that Germany is wedded to the 
notion of a "two-speed" EMU, because it wishes to maintain hegemony over European monetary 
policy. Indeed recent reports in the press suggest that the fear of losing autonomy over monetary policy 
has prompted the German Finance ministry to prepare for allowing the DM to circulate alongside the 
ECU in the first few years of EMU, as an insurance against an undesirable outcome in EMU. Alesina 
and Grilli (1993) use a simplified model that suggests that by proceeding at "two speeds", the 
achievement of complete integration would be in jeopardy. In other words, the path dependency of the final outcome would determine the extent of monetary union within the EU. Option ii) is basically the 
current conditions, as specified in the Maastricht Treaty. 
  Option iii) completely eliminates the fiscal criteria (and therefore implicitly the Protocol on the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure). This option recognises that the fiscal criteria are arbitrary in nature and 
are perhaps desirable, but not necessary conditions, for attaining EMU. A "two-speed" EMU would for 
the most part be averted under this option. De Grauwe (1994) has recommended a variation of this 
option, invoking the principle of free choice by letting each Member State decide when and if they 
wish to join EMU. By invoking this principle, though, a "2-speed" EMU process becomes almost a 
certainty. 
  The next four options allow slight variations to the Maastricht  
Treaty conditions, but all allow EMIl to be realised, while allowing increased national fiscal autonomy 
and altering the current plans for only a slight expansion of the EC budget. Option iv) maintains the 
budget deficit criteria as an entry condition, thereby recognising the importance of an attempt by the 
more inflation-prone Member States to curb deficits. Note that maintaining a budget deficit of 3% or 
less would not necessarily lower debt/GDP levels. To counter this constraint on national fiscal 
autonomy on the approach to stage 3, the EU budget would undergo a slight increase over current 
projections to 1999. 
    Option v) alters option iv) by imposing the budget deficit criterion both as an entry condition and 
post-entry into stage 3. Under this scenario, the EU budget would need to continue increasing so that it 
reached levels envisaged by the McDougall Report (over twice the level for 1999 that was agreed upon 
at the Edinburgh summit). 
    option vi) adds the debt condition post-entry into stage 3 but allows the dynamic fiscal criteria to be 
applied, thereby enforcing a reduction in debt-GDP ratios in addition to constraining budget deficits. 
Here, not only would the EU budget have to substantially increase to allow moderate budget surpluses, 
but also the EU would acquire some fiscal sovereignty, in the form of additional policy competences. 
This increase in the EU budget now goes beyond the levels recommended in the McDougall Report. 
    Option vii) would be identical to option vi) but would deny the usefulness of fiscal criteria as entry 
conditions. In other words, option vi) represents a modified 'monetarist' approach to EMU as, unlike 
option iii) which also drops the fiscal criteria, it takes other federal structures as a model but recognises 
the need to address the budget deficit and debt problems in some Member States. Again, substantial 
inter-regional resource flow would be permitted through a larger EU budget with more fiscal policy 
competences transferred to the EU level. 
 
    Economic options are all well and good, but what is politically feasible? In option i), the fiscal 
criteria are so unrealistic for certain Member States that their entry into stage 3 would be left to the 
discretion of the "first speed" countries and may not materialise. In option ii), the same fate may befall 
these Member States, but clearly much depends on the attitude of the Bundesbank to strict adherence 
to the Maastricht criteria and to the leeway for liberal interpretations of the dynamic "let-out" clauses 
by the EU. Indeed, with regard to the other options, the Bundesbank appears to have considerable clout 
in these negotiations, so some post-stage 3 entry conditions may still be necessary; at the other end of 
the spectrum, the UK government would be violently opposed to any 'federalist' structure with 
substantial redistributive powers for Brussels. This rules out options iii), vi) and vii), leaving only 
options i), ii), iv) and v). Option i) is unlikely to materialise, as southern European Member States are 
not going to give up the dynamic criteria for nothing in return. 
    From a bargaining perspective, options iv) or v) seem to be the most likely reasonable alternatives to 
option ii) (the status quo). 
Clearly, much depends on the price that Germany is willing to pay to eliminate the dynamic "let-out" 
clauses, as to which of these would be favoured. Perhaps an additional "let-out" clause for Germany to 
continue using the DM during stage 3 could also be introduced into the bargaining as an appeasement. 
Both these options, and option v), in particular, would also be entertained by the European 
Commission, which has, for some time, been trying to justify more fiscal policy competences and give 
the European parliament more credibility as well as a greater role as a pan-European decision-making 
body (see Financial Times (1994a) for more on this). 
 
c) Replacinq the Treaty 
     If one accepts that a parallel/gradualist approach to EMU is fraught with political and economic 
adjustment problems, other options are available. The options that considered are as follows: 
  i) an abandonment of gradualism and an attempt to pursue       political and 
economic integration before the optional       replacement of national currencies 
with the ECU; or 
  ii) a competing currency 'Hard ECU' option - issuance of       ECUs by the 
ECB which would circulate alongside national       currencies but at a fixed rate with 
the strongest currency    in  the  EC;  or 
  iii) a reinstatement of the ERM of the EMS as the vital       stepping-stone to 
a single currency with appropriate         measures to minimise speculative 
attacks. 
These options are generic in nature, and could be combined: for example, option i) is not incompatible 
with option iii). Option i) is an 'economists' view of the integration process, with political and 
economic integration foreshadowing any monetary union - in this scenario monetary integration would 
come about in an evolutionary manner, once other policy instruments are in place and EC political 
institutions have had time to evolve. Option ii) would not necessarily call for a priori political and 
economic integration, but would operate in an evolutionary way, in this instance based on individual 
agent's monetary preferences. EMU then may never be completed as a process, but trade and cross-
border transactions would be facilitated and fiscal restraint would be encouraged. Option iii) is perhaps 
the most controversial, and would necessitate a thorough review of the recent adverse experience of 
EC Member States with the ERM, as well as substantial reform of the political and defensive 
mechanisms that are embodied in such a system. John Williamson (.Financial Times (1993c)) echoed 
this view, recently advocating restoration of the EMS but with "rates...pegged at levels that make sense 
in the light of the fundamentals and that are promptly changed to reflect changes in the fundamentals". 
If a monetary authority such as the EMI were given complete control of the workings of the EMS, 
perhaps more prompt and appropriate adjustment would take place, confounding any speculative 
attacks on the system. Once economic convergence had been achieved, as defined by exchange rate 
stability and perhaps other criteria defined by an independent EMI, Member States could then proceed 
to replacement of national currencies with ECUs. Indeed, in the shorter term, whatever route is chosen, 
the European Commission is likely to push for attainment of EMU as rapidly as possible, as floating 
exchange 
rates threaten many of the policies of the Union, notably the common 
agricultural policy. Table 6 summarises these options:- 
 
      TABLE  6       
      Feasible Replacements for Maastricht 
 
 Exchange  Economic  "2- 
 Rate Union  Speed" 
Option Stability?  Complete?  EMIl? 
Maastricht (Yes)  Converging  Yes 
i) (Possibly)  Yes  No 
ii)  ? ? (Likely) 
iii) Yes  ?  (Possibly) 
 
  As to the issue of which of these plans is politically   feasible, only option i) precludes the 
possibility to a "two-speed" 
Europe. Indeed, in option ii), as long as legal tender provisions 
are in place in all Member States, the decision as to when to 
introduce EMU is removed from the national governments, and also 
from Brussels. Option iii) would probably be opposed by the UK, but 
as participation in the ERM is voluntary, it could hardly claim that 
its hands were tied. If adopted and effectively implemented, the UK 
would soon find itself left on the periphery of the integration 
process. All of these options have, at some point, been advocated by economists. Nevertheless, replacing whole 
sections of the Maastricht Treaty is likely to be attempted only after failure to reach a consensus on 
modifications to the treaty - so in this sense all the above options are second-best political solutions 
compared with those advocated in section VIb). The interactions of the special interests of all the 
political parties concerned is the subject of the next section. 
 
d)  EMU = Economic Jinfism or a Pyrrhic Victory 
 
  In 1996, Member States will have a chance to amend the Maastricht Treaty at the scheduled Inter-
Governmental Conference (IGC). Posturing on the issue of EMU has already started, as of writing, and 
will no doubt continue up until the IGC. 
    Among Member States, the critical factor affecting the outcome of this IGC will be the inclusion or 
otherwise of Germany in EMU. German concerns relate to:  
   i) the replacement of the DM with the Ecu;  
  ii) application of the fiscal criteria; and  
   iii) political union. 
The first concern relates to replacement of a currency which the Bundesbank has monopoly control 
over, with a currency which will be controlled by the ECB Council. The members of this council will, 
in the transition period, consist of those countries which the European Commission deems to have met 
the criteria. As the dynamic 'let-out' clauses give the Commission great flexibility in exercising the 
fiscal criteria, several Member States that have historically had much higher inflation rates could 
become voting members of the ECB Council, thereby having a potentially large influence over pan-
European monetary policy, and by implication, German monetary policy. 
  Replacement of the DM is the major motivation behind the recent expression of angst over the 
second German concern, that of credibility of application of the fiscal criteria. Ireland, the European 
Commission has argued, has a public debt that is "sufficiently diminishing" at a "satisfactory pace", so 
can proceed with EMU in 1996 (with Luxembourg). Belgium, Greece and Italy are now hopeful of the 
same leniency regarding the fiscal criteria, even though their public debt levels are over twice those 
stipulated by the fiscal criteria. This no doubt will be severely resisted by the Germans, but if they are 
unsuccessful this might prompt an activation of plans to allow the DM to circulate alongside the Ecu to 
become official German policy. 
  The third concern is the institutional aspects of EMU, and in particular the state of European 
Political Union (EPU). The Germans argue that the ECB, however independent, cannot operate 
effectively in a vacuum - a central bank has to have a governmental framework within which to 
operate. Besides the issue of democratic accountability, there is no equivalent of a finance ministry or 
treasury in Europe, so this will not allow the proper interaction between monetary and fiscal policy at 
the European level. 
    There are, of course, other concerns about how the Treaty might be amended and interpreted. The 
British have an opt-out clause for the whole process, but would be reluctant to exercise it if they were 
the only Member State not to participate in EMU. The southern European Member States are 
particularly concerned about the prospect of a "two-speed" EMU, if the fiscal criteria were to be 
strictly adhered to. 
  Indeed, the prospect of a "two-speed" EMU appears increasingly likely, with the 'borderless' 
Schengen Treaty countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) with 
Ireland, forming the initial Ecu block. In political terms, this would create great divisions in Europe 
and might cause a severe rupture in cooperative efforts between Member States. Further, such a 
marked division might derail economic union and reverse the trend in economic convergence among 
EU Member States as a whole. 
    It is ironic, however, that if a compromise at the 1996 IGC exists, it is probably to be found in the 
ERM. Noteworthy, is the fact that despite the currency turbulence of 1991/92, most Member States 
have kept their currencies close to, or within the old ERM +/-2.25% fluctuation bands. So, if there is an 
aversion to a "two-speed" EMU, perhaps the ERM may have some role to play in a political 
compromise. One might envisage the ERM criteria coming back into play as a criteria, but at the same 
time another of the criteria being overlooked. So, for instance, one of the fiscal criteria could be 
replaced by the ERM criteria on a selective Member State basis. In this schema, Member States would 
be eligible to proceed to EMU if they fulfilled four out of the five of the Maastricht criteria. This would be particularly attractive to the benelux countries (with the exception of Luxembourg, which 
already satisfies all the four remaining criteria), as both Belgium and the Netherlands would expect to 
be part of the "hard core" Member States entering EMU initially, yet they both fail to meet both of the 




VI.  Conclusions     
 
 
  It is unfortunate that the objective of EMU forced upon the EMS 
a role for which it was not designed. If EMU is to be realised in the current political climate, the EMS 
will probably remain on the periphery of the integration process, a relic of earlier ambitions to stabilise 
European exchange rates. Nevertheless, in the light of the severe economic conditions imposed by the 
Maastricht Treaty on some Member States, perhaps the EMS's demise is unfortunate, given that it 
could (in its narrow band version) be part of a revised Maastricht blueprint in which Member States 
have to achieve four out of the five original criteria. 
    The natural adjoint to the economic issues surrounding the major obstacles to EMU, notably the 
fiscal criteria, is not primarily one of exchange rate instability, but rather that of the role of 
supranational institutions, particularly in relation to overall EU fiscal policy. Indeed, if attainment of 
EMU is foremost in policy-makers minds (and in some cases this is not at all certain), then reaching an 
acceptable compromise on modification of the fiscal criteria is paramount. The current Maastricht path 
and the criteria embodied in this approach will not allow the ultimate objective of EMU to be attained. 
  The most likely outcome, if a "two-speed" EMU is to be avertedis a political trade-off between 
abandonment of the dynamic "let-out" clauses to the fiscal criteria and abandonment of the debt criteria, 
while modestly increasing the evolution of the EU budget. The range of possible outcomes poses 
important questions about the role of political union in the EU, the implementation of the principle of 
subsidiarity and the division of economic policy competences between the EU and Member State 
governments. 
  EMU is certainly not dead, but the process of keeping it alive has already compromised the 
objective of European exchange rate stability (the EMS) and will inevitably pose further economic 
problems and difficult policy choices. It is easy to find examples of common currency areas that do not 
fulfill the economic conditions of an optimum currency area - perhaps these examples can shed some 
light through further research on the obstacles still to be overcome in Europe. 
 Lastly, from a history of thought perspective, it is interesting to note that the European economic 
debates of the early 1970s are still alive and well, not in their original 'economist' versus 'monetarist' 
guise, but as a "two-speed" versus collective approach to EMU (or northern versus southern European 
Member States). The fact that this debate is still alive is not because the wheel has been re-invented, 
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